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SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN KANSAS AFFECTING
THE STATUS OF EMPIDYED TEACHERS

I

Introduction
The Supreme Court as the highest tribunal in the State of
Kansas has from time to time during the Statehood of Kansas rendered
decisions that are of importance in settling controversies between
teachers and school district boards.

In any state there is a need

for~ higher court to see that justice is meted out to those who,
through some misl.lllderstanding, become involved in conflicting ideas
or opinions.

Since time immortal there has been conflicting ideas

and opinions in all societies and institutions.

One result of which

is our Supreme Court set-up.
The purpose of this thesis is to review the Supreme Court decisions affecting the status of employed teachers in Kansas.

These

decisions will be reviewed under three separate categories, namely:
1.

Teacher contracts

2.

Teacher dismissal and removal

3.

Teacher compensation

A teacher contract as referred to in this study is an agreement between
the teacher, as an individual and a corporate body, knoVJll as the school
district board.

Dismissal and removal are synonymous terms meaning to
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remove from, or to terminate, or to part from.

Compensation will be

thought of as the gain or pay that is expected to be given to the
teacher by the school district board for the services rendered by that
teacher.
No previous study has been made of these particular types of
cases affecting teachers.

There has been, however, a limited number

of studies made to determine what effect supreme court decisions had
in determining our present school systems .

They are:

'Some phases of

Kansas School Law as Determined by Suprem~ Court Decisions' by Roy A.
Hoglund, Kansas University, 1934.

'Some Phases of School Law as De-

termined by Supreme Court Decisions' by Rolland R. Elliott, Kansas Universi~y, 1935.

'Some Phases of Kansas School Law as Interpreted by the

State Supreme Court' by John F. Lindquist, Kansas University, 1935.
' A Study in Educational Trends Affecting Sc ool Development in Kansas
from the Beginning of Statehood to the Present Time' by Lavn-ence Saylor,
Fort Hays Kansas State College, 1937.
The material for this thesis for the most part has been procured from the reports of the decisions of the Supreme Court, known as
the Kansas Reports .

A small portion is from the reports of the Kansas

Courts of Appeals , subsidiary courts of the Supreme Court in Kansas.
Hatcher's digest was used as an aid to make a bibliography of the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Kansas Courts of Appeals relating
to schools.

Those decisions dealing with teachers were then selected

for this study.
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II

TEACHER CONTRACTS

A contract between a teacher and a district school board signed
by two members in the absence of each other is not binding.
with one member of the board is also insufficient.

A contract

The law concerning

the hiring of a teacher reads as follows: 1
'Where the power is vested in a district
board of a school district composed of three,
to contract with and hire a teacher for and
in the name of the district and a written
contract is signed by two members of the board
in the absence of each other, without consultation with each other, or vdth the other member,
and without any meeting of the dis trict board,
upon the application of a par t y seeking to be
employed as a teacher, such contract is not
binding upon the school district. 1 1

In a case before the court in 1882 brought by G. P. Ailanan v .
School district No. 16, Butler County, the court decided in favor of
the defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Horton,
'This action was commenced by plaintiff in
error against defendant in error before a justice of the peace of Butler county, upon an alleged written contract dated in January, 1880,
setting forth that plaintiff was employed to
teach a school for district No. 16 of Butler
County, for the term of three months, commencing
on April 12, 1880, at $25. per month, to be paid
at the end of each month. Judgment was rendered
for plaintiff by the justice of the peace, and
the defendant appealed to the district court. Upon
the trial in the district court a demurrer to the

1.

Laws of Kansas 1876, ch. 122, art. 4, seo. 24.

c. J.:
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evidence was interposed by defendant; the court sustained
the demurrer, and rendered judgment for the defendant.
The plaintiff duly excepted and brings the case here.
The question for our consideration is, whether the
district board can bind the school district by a written contract of the character of the one sued on, without having a board meeting, at which all the members
are present. Section 56, ch. 92, p. 830, Comp. Laws
of 1879, reads: 'The district board in each district
shall contract with and hire qualified teachers for
and in the name of the district, which contract shall
be in writing, and shall specify the wages per week or
month, as agreed upon by the parties, and such contract
shall be filed in the district clerk's office; and, in
conjunction with the county superintendent, may dismiss
for incompetency, cruelty, negligence, or immorality.'
It is an elementary principle, that when several persons are authorized to do an act of a public nature,
which requires deliberation, they all should be convened,
because the advice and opinions of all may be useful,
though all do not unite in opinion. We think, in view
of the elementary principles applicable to the duty of
a body like the district board, consisting of several
persons authorized to do acts of a public nature, where
the power to contract with the person seeking employment as a teacher is vested by the statute in the
'board,' that all must meet t ogether, or be notified
to meet together, or have the opportunity of meeting t ogether, to consult over the employment of the teacher,
before a contract can be legally entered into by them
so as to bind the district. Certainly two members would
have no right to exclude the third from consulting or
acting with them, and although it is not necessary that
all of the members of the board should be present at a
board meeting, or that all of the members should concur
in the making of the contract in order to bind the district, yet the contract should be agreed upon at a meeting
of the board where all are present, or have t he opportunity of being present•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
It appears from the evidence that A. Ailanan was director, Martin A. Pratt Clerk, and a Mr. Turner treasurer.
The paper was signed on the 7th or 8th of January. The
plaintiff saw M.A. Pratt at his own house, and there obtained his signature. He then presented the paper on the
same or next day to his father, A. Ailanan, at his own
house, and his father signed it, neither the director nor
clerk being together at the time. It is further in evidence that the plaintiff did not present the contract to
Mr. Turner for his signature, and that he saw the clerk
and his father, the director, separately in reference to

such contract; the paper was signed by the director and
clerk in the absence of each other, and this was not
done at any board meeting. Under these circumstances
we can hardly see the necessity for the court to have
submitted to the jury a:n.y question of fact about the
contract having been signed at or after a meeting of
the district board. The action on the part of the
clerk and the director seems to have been taken upon
the personal application of the plaintiff to each of
them individual ly, and separately from each other.
Taking all the circumstances together, the evidence is
of such a nature as to preclude any fair inference
that the officers whose signatures are to the paper
sued on were acting under the direction of any power
conf'erred by the district board or by any meeting of
the board .
••••••••••••••• At a board meeting••• ••••••••, a
majority of the board could have ordered or entered
into the contract, notwithstanding the other member
dis sented.
The judgment of the district ~curt will be affirmed.
All the Justices concurring.'
A contract between a teacher and the school district board must
be in writing, but it is not necessary that it be reduced to writing
during a session of the district board; it is enough if the contract ,
though made in parol, be entered into at such sassmon; it may be reduced to writing and signed after the board has adjourned.

In 1889

the court reviewed a case in error from the Finney District Court and
reversed the decision of the lower court.
court was in favor of the defendant.

The decision of the lower

Charles F. Faulk v. H. L. McCart-

ney, as director of School District No . 6 of Finney County.
ion states the case.

Opinion by Holt, C.:

'This action was brought by Charles F. Faulk,
plaintiff in error, £or the purpose of compelling

2.

Kansas Reports, Volume 27, p. 129-32.

The opin-

6

the defendant, as director of School District No . 6,
Finney county, to sign an order on the district treasurer for the payment of $40 for wages as teacher for
one school month. The Hon. A. J. Abbott, judge of the
twenty-seventh judicial district, granted an alternative writ of mandamus, on January 1, 1888, in the Finney district court, a motion to quash the alternative
writ was sustained. The plaintiff brings the case here
for review.
It is claimed that the alternative writ of mandamus,
treated as the petition of plaintiff, did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, for
two reasons: first, that it is not shown that the contract between the teacher and the school district board
was in writing; second, that the director is not required
by law to sign the orders drawn by the clerk upon the
treasurer for the payment of teachers' wages. In the alternative writ it is alleged that the plaintiff and the
school district entered into a contract to teach the district
school in District No. 6 for six months at $40 per month,
payable at the end of each month.
The general allegations that the contract between
plaintiff and the school district was in writing are suffici ent, but defendant contends that these allegations are
limited by the following part of this writ, namely: 'That
said written contract was entered into by and between said
plaintiff and said school istrict in pursuance to and
with an agreement, verbal contract, and order previously
thereto, made and entered into by and between aaid plaintiff and said school district at and during a meeting of
said school district board, held as aforesaid, prior to
so making and entering into said agreement, verbal contract, and order.' A general allegation cannot be held
to be any broader or more effectual than the speoial circumstances that are detailed in the pleading; therefore
we are called upon to pass directly upon the question as
presented by the charges specially detailed as above set
forth. There was a contract entered into between the
plaintiff and the district board, not by a part of the
members thereof, but by the district board; that contract,
being in parol, was afterward reduced to writing. It may
have been done immediately after the adjournment of the
board; in any event, the contract is embodied in writing
made and authorized by it. It was the contract of the
board, and was reduced to writing. Probably a majority
of the contracts for teachers' wages in the state are made
in parol, and afterward reduced to writing; it may be done
at a meeting of the district board--that is the better
way; it may, however, be directed to be done at that time

7

and irmnediately a.:f'terward reduced to writing by the olerk;
ordinarily the contract is signed by the director, but
we know of no rule that would prevent the treasurer from
signing instead of the director. The main fact to be determined is, whether the board made this contract; if it
did, it could be reduced to writing and signed by the director or the treasurer. The law requiring the written
contract between the teacher and the district board was
sufficiently complied with in this instance/•••••••••••••
We recommend that the judgment be reversed.
By the Court: It is so ordered.
All the Justices concurring.' 3
A teacher suing on a contract must prove the authority of the office r s s i gning for the school district.

If all members of a board

agr ee to hire a certain teacher, but one is absent when contract is
made-- t he contract is nevertheless good.

These points of law were af~

f irmed by the Southern Department of the Kansas Courts of Appeals in
the case of L.
sas in 1895.
Troup, judge .

c.

Brown v. School District No. 41, Cowley County, Kan-

This case was in error from Cowley district court;

Judgment was for the defendant in the distri ct court and

affinned by the higher court.

The opinion of the court was deliv ered

by Cole , J.:
'This was an action brought by plaintiff in error
a gainst the defendant in error in the district court
of Cowley county, Kansas, upon an alleged written contract, dated in July, 1888, setting forth that plaintiff in error was employed to teach school for district
No. 41, Cowley county, for a tenn of six months, commencing October 1, 1888, at $50 per month . The defendant in error had judgment be l ow, and pla intiff in error
brings the case here.
••••••••••• It is sufficient if all are pre se:mrt, or
had an opportunity to be present, and that at least t?ro
of them agreed to make the ~ontract in dispute . Applying
these views to this case , it seems clear to us that the
contract sued ·upon was one made by the district board,
end was therefore the contract of the district.
Plaintiff in error urges that the trial court com3.

M. G.

Kansas Reports, Volume 42, p. 695-98.

0

mitted error in compelling him, after he had proven the
execution of the contract., to assume the burden of proof
and prove this meeting and the steps which led up to the
completed contract. Under the pleadings in this case.,
we think the ruling of the court was correct. The petition nowhere alleges that the persons who signed the said
contract were officers of the school district, or that
they had authority to act for the district. It does not
allege that the district had any officers, or who they
were. The answer denies generally and specifically any
authority in the persons who signed the contract to act
for the school district, and nowhere admits that either
of the persons so signing were officers of said district.
There being no sufficient allegations in the petition to
require a verified answer., the burden was upon the plaintiff below to prove the authority of those purporting to
act for the district•••••••••••••••••••••••••
The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
All the Judges concurring. 1 4
1m invalid contract will become binding on a district school

board by ratifying the contract in accepting a teacher.

In 1898 a

case, Edna Jones v . School District No. 144, Elk County, was before
the Kansas Courts of Appeals ., Southern Department .

The decision of

the district court., which was in favor of the defendant, was reversed.
The opini on of the court was delivered by Milton., J.:
'Edna Jones bring these proceedings i n error to review the ruling of the district court of Elk county,
sustaining the defendant's demurrer to her petition.
The petition alleged that on July 22., 1891., the plaintiff, being then and ever sinoe duly qualified as a
school-teacher., entered into a written contract in due
form with the school board of the defendant district
to teach one of the four departments of defendant's
school for the ensuing term of eight months, beginning
September 7. 1891, at forty dollars per month; that on
the 30th day of July, 1891., the annual meeting of said
district was held, and that the electors then voted
that female teachers should be employed, but did not
take action on any other proposition; that after said
school meeting the district board met., and, with full

4.

Kansas Courts of Appeals., Volume 1, p . 530-6.
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knowledge of the existence of plaintiff's contract, employed two female teachers, who, with plaintiff and other
lady who had also been employed prior to said annual
meeting., constituted the corps of teachers when school
opened on September 7, 1891, for the term; that pursuant
to the terms of said written contract., and with the full
knowledge end consent of the school board, plaintiff
taught in said schools for nine weeks, end was then,
without just cause or excuse, discharged by said school
board and not permitted to teach any longer; that plaintiff was paid by said board according to the terms of
said contract at the end of the first and second months
she so taught, and that by the unwarranted act of the
di strict board in so discharging her, plaintiff lost .all
opport unity of obtaining a school, and thereby suffered
a loss of wages equal to the amount stated in said contract . She prayed for judgment for the entire amount of
her wages••••••••••••••••
The contract in question, i f valid when made, was enti re; if it beceme operative by adoption it was likelvise
entire. The petition alleges that plaintiff was disc~arged without just cause or reason. We think she is
entitled to have the question raised decided on a trial
of the case upon its merits. The judgment of the district
court is reversed, and the case remanded with i nstructions
to overrule the demurrer to plaintiff's petition. 15
The case of Mattie E. Parrick, Appellee, v. School Di s trict No. l
in the counties of Riley and Geary., Appellant., was before the court in
1917.

The court determined that when the teacher was allowed to teach

and paid, the school board waives irregularities in employing her.
syllabus by the court:
'Where a teacher was employed by the members of a
s chool board without a formal meeting of the board
and a contract was signed by two members of t he board
engaging her servioes for a school term of eight months,
and the contract delivered to her, and under such irr e gular employment she was permitted to teach for four
months, and school warrants for her i s sued each month
i n her favor and she was paid pursuant t hereto in accordance with her contract, the circumstances recited
amount to a ratification of her irregular contract of
employment. ,6
5.
6.

Kansas Courts of Appeals., Volmne 7, P• 927-31.
Kansas Reports., Volume 100, p. 569.

The

.HJ

The opi ni on of the court was delivered by Dawson, J.:
'The plaintiff was employed as teacher in the defendant school district for a term of eight months
beginning in September 1914. The board dismissed her
because she took an extra week's holiday at Christmas
time without the consent of the school board.
rt seems that it was inf orma.lly understood between
the school board and the teacher that owing to bad
roads end shortage of coal the midwinter vacation
should le.st two weeks and that the school should be
reopened on January 4, 1915. The teacher was told by
the clerk of the board that the time could be made up
by extending the school another week in the spring.
The teacher was married during the vacation, and
wrote the clerk of the school board: 'Important business detains me for another week so I'll not be back
until Jan. 10th. Will you please let the other children know when I 111 be back. '
Thi s did not suit the members of the school board,
and within a day or two after January 4th another
teacher was employed. When the plaintiff appeared
for duty the following week the clerk of the board
informed her that on account of her taking the extra
week she had broken her contract and had dismissed
herself.
After some parleyin g the plaintiff and the school
board went to the county seat to have a meeting with
the cotmty superintendent to consider the matter in
conference with officer pursuant to the statute (Gen.
Stat. 1915, sec. 8975), which provided that the district board in conjunction with the county superintendent may dismiss a teacher 'for i nc ompetency,
cruelty, ne gligence or immorality.' The only basis
for invoting this statute was on the question of
negligence. The county superintendent disagreed with
the school board and stated that while she hoped the
teacher would resign, she said: 'I told the board
t hat I could not concur in the dismissal of t he plaintiff for it seemed to me she had not been sufficiently
negligent for her dismissal ••••••• I told them (the
board) that I thought she had not done just ri ght i n
adjourning school over one week •••••••• r hoped they
(the board) would change their minds, and I made it
plain to them that I felt I couldn't concur · i n the
dismis sal of the teacher.'
After the term of school closed, the plaintiff not
having secured other professional employment in the
interim e.nd there being no suggestion that with dili-
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genoe she might have done so, this action was begun,
and judgment was rendered against the school district
for the teacher's wages for four months, which was the
remainder of the school term according to her contract.
The defendant school district contends th.at the contract of employment was never formally entered into between the school board and the teacher, she procured
her employment merely by interviewing the members of
t he school board individually, and that her contract
was executed in the same irregular way. Of course this
pr ocedure was invalid. But pursuant to this irregular
contract and employment the teacher was permitted to
open school in September e.nd to teach for four months,
and the board paid her re gularly month by month for her
services. In view of this, a defense based upon the
irregularity of her contract of employment should not
be countenanced. The board were more derelict than the
t eacher. It was their duty to meet regularly each
month and order payment of her sa lary as it became due.
They had no right to disburse the district funds in any
other manner. If the acts of t he school board were
called in question for irre gularly paying out the distri ct funds the members of the board would exercise
t he ir wits to .show· that t he district funds were disbursed with sufficient re gularity to relieve them personally. Doubtless they are upright men, but it is
shown t hat they had not i n several years had a formal
meeting as a school board, and the new teacher secured
t o supplant the plaintiff was employed i n the s ame irre gular way. One member of the board t estified: ' The
signature (to the plaintiff teacher's contract) ••••••
looks like my wife's writing . She has signed a s chool
order or two when I was not at home without my consent
•• ••••••••••• I have been a member of the s chool board
for seven or eight years ••••••••••• We have always employed the teacher without a meeting of the board. Mis s
Martin (the new teacher) was employed the same way ••••••
•• • I did not learn until after this trouble arose t hat
the law required a board to meet as a board i n order t o
elect teachers.'
We think that since the irregularities touchi ng the
contract of employment a.n.d its execution were t hose of
the school board rather than those of the teacher, there
was a sufficient ratification, for the purpose of thi s
case, by pennitting her to teach four mont hs under her
contract and by paying her from month to month in accordance with its terms. Of course this rat ificat ion was of
a piece with the loose, irre gular conduct which had char-
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acterized all the acts of the school board, but
under the circumstances we think it was so closely a.kin to ratification that it will be recognized
as such •••••••••••••
The judgment is affirmed. 17
The case of A.

w.

Calloway, Appellant, v. Atlanta Rural High

School, District No . 2, Appellee, was before the court in 1930.

The

court determined that a school district board, having only such powers
as are conferred upon district boards in charge of the common schools,
has no power to make a valid contract of employment with a teacher
prior to the annual meeting provided for by the statute.

The opinion

of the court was delivered by Jochems, J.:
'This was an action on contract; the lower court sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's petition and plaintiff
appe als.
The petition in substance stated that the plaintiff
was by vocation a teacher, a graduate of the Kansas State
teachers College of Emporia, and that he held a life certificate from that institution ; that on February 3, 1927,
he was then engaged in teaching the rural high school
conducted by the defendant, having been employed for that
school year; that on February 3, 1927, the three members
of the school district board met and entered into a contract with him in writing, whereby they employed plaintiff to act as principal of the rural high school conducted by the defendant, for a tenn of nine months commencing the first Monday of September, 1927, at a salary
of $255 per month; that the said board was constituted
according to the laws of the state of Kansas; that two
of the members of said board would hold office under the
term for which they were elected for a period of at least
one year from and after April, 1927, and that the term of
only one member of said board would expire in April , 1927;
that on July 14, 1927, the plaintiff received notice by
registered mail, purporting to be signed by the clerk and
one of the directors of the said school board, notifying
him that he was not the principal of the Atlanta Rural

7.

Kansas Reports, Volume 100, P• 569-72.
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High School for the coming year and in no way connected
with said school; that thereaf'ter he duly presented himself at the be ginning of the school term and signified
his readiness to comply with his contract; that he made
diligent efforts to obtain other employment for the
school year, but was unable to do so and asked for judgment for the full contract price for the nine months.
There was attached to the petition a oopy of the written
contract, which was as alleged in the petition; also
copy of the notice of July 14, 1927.
The plaintiff contends that the school board is an
entity recogni zed by law independent of the names of
the various individuals who hold the offices of director,
clerk, or treasurer; that the school board as an entity
is the only authority having power to employ a school
principal or superintendent as well as teachers; that
there is no statutory inhibition preventing the school
dis t rict board from employing superintendents or principals at any time after February 1, and that the school
board had the authority to enter into the contract which
it did enter into as of February 3, 1927.
The defendant talces the positi on that the school
board had no authority to enter into a contract with the
plaintiff which would bind the district, prior to the annual district meeting in April.
It is conceded that the rural high school maintained
by the defendant does not come within the provisions of
R.S. 72-1027. This section relates to the authority of
district boards in districts maintaining schools which
employ ten or more full-time teachers and provides that
such boards shall not enter into a contract prior to
February l for a terzn beginning the following August.
R.S. 72-3507 relates to rural high school boards and
provides that such boards 'except as herein provided,
shall have the powers prescribed by law for school district boards.' It is clear, therefore, that the district board in charge of the rural high school maintained by the defendant had only such ri ghts, powers and
authority as are conferred upon school district boards
in charge of the common schools.
The question is: Can a school district ooard created
under the general laws governing school districts , legally contract with a teacher prior to the annual meeting,
for a term to begin at a date subsequent to such annual
me eting?
Board~ of education and school district boards are
the creatures of statutory law. The extent of their

14

powers and authority.mus t be determined from the
statutes by which they are governed . School distr ict
boards such a s the one governing the defendant are
e lected under the laws of Kansas at an annual meeting •

...It...appears
.... that the annual meeting of the school

district is intended by the legislature to be a pure
democracy. Each qual ified voter residing within the
district is given the ri ght to appear at the annual
me eting and there exercise his voice i n all matters
pe rtaini ng to the conduct of the affairs of the
school dis trict as outlined by the statutes. Each
voter has the right to s ay, at the annual meeting in
April, how long a term shall be conducted during the
ensuing school year. Each voter has the ri ght likewise to voice his judgment as to the amount of compensati on to be paid to each teacher h ired by the dis trict. He has the further ri ght to vote on the question of whether any school shall be conducted by the
district during the ensuing year . The powers of the
school district board are clearly l imited by the express powers granted to the voters of the district to
be exerci sed at their annual meeting.
The legislature of this state has , as above indicated, amended the laws relating to school districts
on numerous occasions and yet it has never seen fit
to confer expressly upon t he district board the pov,er
to hire teachers, prior t o the annual meeting, f or
the term following such annual meeting. If the legislature of this state deemed it wi se pub l ic policy so
to do it would be a simple matter for it to so amend
the statutes.
It is not within the province of this court to extend the statutes beyond t heir plain intendment . Until the annual meeting has fi xed the length of term
and the amount of wage s t o be paid, it is manifest
that the board is i n no position to make a contract.
The judgment is affirmed.
Burch, J., dissenting. 1 8
When a teacher misrepresented that he held certificate, it is
equivalent t o misrepresentat ion as to educati onal qualifications and
the contract is rendered unenforceable.

8.

The court affirmed the de-

Kansas Reports, Volume 129, P• 659-72.

15

cision of an appeal from the Clay district court in 1931, in the case
of Virgil B. Strange, Appellant, v. School District No. 97, Appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by Smith, J.:
' The action was against a school district to collect
de.ma.ges for the breach of a contract to employ plaintiff to teach school . A demurrer to the evi dence of
plaintiff was sustained. He appeals.
The facts are that Virgil B. Strange had taken
some work at the Kansas State Teachers College of Emporia some time prior to the fall of 1927. When he
finished his work there that spring he thought he was
entitled to a three-year certificate entitling him to
.teach for three years in the schools of the state. He
wrote a letter in May, 1927, to the board at Green,
Kan., making application for a position on the faculty
of that school. He stated therein that he was the
holder of a three-year certificate. On the first day
of September, 1927, appellant and appellee entered
into a written contract whereby appellant agreed to
teach in the school of appellee for the term beginning
September 5 of that year, and appellee agreed to pay
him $120 a month therefor. The contract recited t hat
Strange was the holder of a three-year certificate.
At this time Strange knew that that recitation did not
state the fact.
1/\lhen the fifth of September crune Strange presented
himself to start teaching school under his contract.
The superintendent of schools was informed on a visit
to Emporia that Strange, according to the records
there, did not have a certificate and was not entitled
to one. He went away and stayed for the balance of
that week.
On the 11th day of September the board had a meeting and advised plaintiff that if he would have acertificate there in two days they would permit him to go
ahead and teach. Appellant then called at the colle ge
and asked them to mail his certificate to the office of
the state superintendent of pub~ic instruction at Topeka for registration. This was done and he went there
and obtained it. He returned to Green and the board
told him that they had made other arrangements and would
not need him. He thereupon sued the board of education
for what his salary would amount to for nine months at
$120 a month, or $1,080.
The evidence was that there has been a misunderstand-

.J.U

ing at the college as to the grades of appellant.
This was corrected by report from one of his instructors. The report should have been made in time so as
to entitle him to certificate on January 18, 1927,
but was not made until some time after September 5,
1927, when the attention of the authorities of the
college was called to the matter by the appellant.
The certificate was then issued to him in September,
but was dated January 18, 1927. The petition alleged,
among other things: 'That plaintiff is the holder of
a three-year state teacher's certificate, No. 3366,
dated January 18, 1927, issued by the Kansas State
Teachers College of Emporia, Kan ., which, under the
laws of the state of Kansas, is a legal certificate,
enabling this plaintiff to teach in the schools of the
state of Kansas for a period of three years.'
· Appellant argues that the provision of the section
which permits district boards to hire 'qualified
teachers' means that the only criterion provided for
is the learning possessed by the applicants, and the
word 'qualified' does not mean -to be in possession
of a certificate. From this he reasons that since,
under the statute it was not necessary for one to be
in possession of any certain certificate to be qualified, and since he possessed the requisite learning,
as is evidenced by the fact that he later procured a
certificate based on school work he had done prior to
that time, the school dis·crict had a ri ght to make a
contract with him, even though he did not possess a
certificate and since they had a right to make a contract the contract they did make was binding upon them.
He makes the argument that the courts in many states
hold that where a teacher has the necessary qualifi cation and does not secure a certificate until after the
contract is made, but before he starts to teach, the
contract is valid. The trouble with applying that
argument to the case at bar is this: Suppose it
should be held that the applicant for a school was
not required to obtain a certificate. In this particular case the school board relied upon the fact
that he said he possessed a certificate as evidence
that he did have the educational qualifications before entering into the contract •••••••••••
All these things appeared in the evidence presented
by appellant in support of his petition and this evidence not only failed to show any ground entitling
plaintiff to the relief prayed for in that petition,
but had it been amended so as to conform with the proof

..
that was offered, still the appellant would not have
been entitled to judgment.
We conclude that the motion to pennit an amendment
to the petition was rightfully overruled and that the
demurrer to evidence of appellant was rightfully sustained and the decision is af'firmed.,9
On March 4, 1929, the Sherman county high school board met in

regular session with all members present, and voted to employ B. R.
Petrie as a teacher for the ensuing school year, and fixed his salary
at $2,250.

The clerk's record of the meeting fully and accurately dis-

closed the action of the board.
ment on the terms stated •

B. R. Petrie orally accepted employ-

.Af'ter the oral acceptance, and on March 18,

the board formally rescinded its action of March 4, and voted not to
hire Mr. Petrie.

The case of B. R. Petrie , Appellee, v. The Sherman

County Community High School and the Board of Education of the city
of Goodland , Appellants, was before the supreme court in the January
term 1932.

The judgment of the district court in favor of Mr. Petrie

was reversed by the supreme court.
no contract.

The supreme court held there was

The opinion of the court was delivered by Burch, J.:

'The action was one by a school teacher to recover
for breach of contract of employment. The verdict and
judgment were in his favor, and the community high
school, which he claimed made the contract of employment with him appeals. The points in the case are,
first, whether a written contract was required by statute, and if so, what the legislature meant by a written
contract ••••••••••••
On March 4 the community high school board met in
regular session at Goodland, with all members present,
and the minutes of the meeting show plaintiff was elect ed to teach vocational agriculture for the ensuing
school year, beginning August 10, at a salary of $2,250.

9.
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Authority of this meeting to do what the minutes
show was done is not contested by either plaintiff
or defendants. Within a day or two plaintiff did
what was sufficient to constitute oral acceptance
<i: employment on the terms stated, and asked the
secretary if his contract had been mailed out, since
he had not yet received it. The secretary replied
they were out of blanks, were having blanks printed,
and as soon as the blanks were received the contract
would be sent out.
On March 18 the board met again, formally rescinded
the action of March 4, voted not to employ plaintiff,
and immediately after the vote was taken notified
plaintiff he would not be employed. The work of teaching vocational agriculture includes summer work--overseeing home-work projects of students, getting new
students, and doing community work among farmers of
the district. Plaintiff testified that on August 10
he 'began teaching.' When school re gularly commenced
about September 10, plaintiff appeared at the schoolhouse, and on the second day of school he found himself locked out •••••••••••
The petition stated facts sufficient to raise the
legal questions which have been discussed. The petition contained a count for damages· in the entire sum
of $2,250, and contained a co1mt for a month's salary
earned between August 10 and time school regularly
commenced in September. A demurrer to the petition
was overruled. There was no allegation (nor proof )
that the board knew plaintiff was •teaching' before
school commenced. It was alleged (~d proved) that
about September 10 (when plaintiff reported for duty
at school) he was locked out. Since the action of
the board on March 4 did not result in a contract, it
availed plaintiff nothing to obtrude himself into the
school's affairs under an unfounded claim he was lega lly employed.
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and
the cause is remanded with direction to sustain the
demurrer to the petition.
Dawson, J., · not sitting.,lO

In the month of May, 1931. Betty Chaffin Grimison. a woman teacher. contracted with the Board of Education of Clay Center, Kansas

10.
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to

teach school for nine months commencing with the opening of the school
term in the following September.

The contract provided that marriage

of the teacher during the term of the contract would automatically terminate the contract.

She married in June of the same year, and when

school commenced in September the board of education refused to permit
her to teach.

The supreme court upheld the decision of the Clay dis-

trict court.

The contract was held valid, and was automatically term-

inated by the teacher's marriage .

The case was Betty Chaffin Grimis on,

Appellant v . The Board of Education of the City of Clay Center, Apellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by Burch, J.:
'The action was one by a school teacher again st a
boa.rd of education for breach of contract of employment to teach school. A demurrer to the petition was
sustained, and plaintiff appeals. In May, 1931, the
board of education of the city of Clay Center employed
Betty Chaffin, a single woman, to teach in the city
schools for nine months, be ginning with the opening of
school in September, 1931. The contract of employment
was in writing and contained the following stipulation:

'A further stipulation is that the
marriage of a lady teacher during the
term for which her contract is made
automatically abrogates said contract . '
In June, 1931, Betty Chaffin married J. G. Grimison.
When school opened in September the board of educat ion
refused to recognize Mrs. Grimison as an employed teacher.
Plaintiff contends her contract was not automatically
abrogated since she married before school commenced and
not within the term for which she was employed. The contract related to status of a woman teacher during . the
term for which she was employed, and plaintiff's engagement vras that if she changed her status, so that she
would not be single during the term of employment the
contract was abrogated when the change occurred .
Plaintiff contends that if the contract be inter-

GU

preted as just indicated, the provision relating to
marriage is void and should be disregarded . This
would leave a valid contract of employment which the
school district refused to perform.
••••••••••••The board of education was charged
with sole control over the schools of the city. No
man and no woman has a right protected by law to be
employed as a teacher by the board of education of
the city of Clay Center. No constitutional, statutory or connnon-law ri ght of any woman would be infringed if the board refused, for any reason, to employ female teachers. Tender of employment to a woman
may be on such terms as the board may deem to be for
the best interest of the school, and acceptance of
terms by an app licant for employment constitutes
waiver of privilege to object to them •

.......................... ..........................

We do not have here a case of discharge of a teacher for some reason, good, bad or indifferent. The case
is one in which a person presented herself as a teacher
who had no contract of employment with the board of education, and the board was not bound to recognize her
as a teacher. Likewise, we have no case of arbitrary
or capricious exercise of power by the board of education. Plaintiff and the board of education agreed on
terms of employment. Plaintiff exercised her privilege to marry and thereby terminated her employment.
The judgment of the distri ct court is affirmed.,11

The district board of a common-school district is powerless to
perform an official act when meeting outside the geographical limits
of the school district.

In a case, J . Warren Dunfield, Appellant v.

School District No. 72 in Coffey County, Appellee , the court affirmed
a decision of the district court in favor of the defendant.
opinion of the court was delivered by Thiele, J.:
'This was an action by a school teacher to recover salary under an alleged written contract of
employment.
In his petition plaintiff alleged his qualifica-

11.
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tions as a teacher; that on April 9, 1932, at a
regular meeting of the school district board held
at the office of the county superintendent of Coffey county, a contract, in writing was entered into
whereby plaintiff was employed as a teacher of a
period of eight months commencing September 5, 1932,
and ending with the school year in 1933, at a salary
of $72.50 per month; that on September 5, 1932, plaintiff presented himself at the schoolhouse of the district prepared to teach the school and was informed
that he would not be permitted to do so and that the
contract was not recognized. Plaintiff claimed damages by reason of the breach of the alleged contract
covering his salary at the rate of $72.50 per month
with interest at 6 per cent upon each monthly payment
as it became due ••••••••••••
Appellant contends that a verbal contract was made
in the district and reduced to writing at the county
seat, and that the boa.rd had power to contract outside
the geographical limits of the district . Although
there is contention about the oral contra.ct, it clearly appears from the testimony that if any oral agreement was made between plaintiff and two members of the
boa.rd, it was before the meeting with the third member,
and when they came to his home, and as soon as the question of regularity of the school meeting and of their
power to act was raised, t e plaintiff and the members
of the board without agreeing on plaintiff's employment
or anything else so far as the record shows, went to
the county seat and had the meeting above mentioned. ·
The only evidence of an oral contract is that, prior to
the meeting with the third member, plaintiff and two
members of the boa.rd agreeing upon plaintiff's employment. At the time there was no meeting of the board
and no notice to the third member, and a binding contract could not be made •••••••••••••••
There being no statute authorizing the meeting of
the board at the county seat end outside the geographical limits of the district, its action at such meeting
was invalid and the contract was a nullity.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Hutchison, J., not sitting. 1 12
On

12.

April 20, 1931, a school district contracted with a teacher to

Kansas Reports, Volume 138, P• 800-2, 1934.

teach in the district school for a term of nine months, beginning September 7, 1931, at a stated salary, subsequently, and before September
7, 1931, the district was consolidated with another district.

The teach-

er was not employed by the board of the consolidated district, and she
was unable to obtain employment during the term specified in her contract.

In an action against the consolidated district the teacher re-

covered judgment.

The case before the court in 1934 was Inez Hill Fuller,

Appellee, v. Consolidated Rural High-s chool District No. 1 in Pottawatomie
County, Appellant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Burch, J.:

'The action was one by a school teacher to recove r
from a consolidated school district on her written contract to teach school made with one of the districts
entering into the consolidation. Plaintiff recovered
and defendant appeals.
Pursuant to the practice of engaging teachers in
the spring for the school year beginning the next fall,
the board of a school district, which, for convenience ,
may be called the Louisvi lle district, entered into a
contract with plaintiff t o teach school for a term of
nine months, commencing September 7, 1931. The contract was signed on April 20, 1931, was in the form prescribed by the state department of education, and provided that plaintiff should be paid a salary of $145
per school month, payable monthly. After the contract
was signed, petitions were circulated i n the Louisville
district for the calling of an election to vote on a
proposition to consolidate the district with another,
which, for convenience, may be called the Wamego district . The election was held on June 16, and the vote
was favorable to consolidation. On June 29 the Wamego
district voted to consolidate. The county superintendent designated the consolidated district as Consolidated Rural High School District No. 1 Pottawatomie
county, Kansas. Ab out July 13 officers constituting a
school board for the consolidated district were elected.
The consolidation proceedings were instituted and consmmnated pursuant to Laws 1931, chapter 275. School
opened in the consolidated district at Wamego on September 7. Plaintiff was not employed as a teacher in

... v

the school of the consolidated district. On September
7 plaintiff, with other teachers and the principal of
the Louisville school, reported for duty and conducted
school at the Louisville schoolhouse for several days,
when they were served by the sheriff with notice from
the board of the consolidated district to desist and
to surrender school property •••••••••••
Plaintiff was ready and willing at all times to
perform the contract on her side, and could not find
employment within the school year. It is contended,
however, she did not diligently seek employment by
the consolidated district board •

..................................................

Actions against defendant by two other teachers,
Dorothy Hinman and Dorothy Mayden, were consolidated
for trial in the district court with the Fuller action,
arid judgments were rendered in favor of plaintiffs in
those cases. It is stipulated that this appeal shall
be determinative of the three cases.
The judgment of the district court in each case is
affirmed.
Johnston, c. J., and Hutchison, J., not sitting.' 13

13.
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III

TEACHER DISMISSAL AND REMOVAL
A teacher may be discharged at any time he fails to give satis-

faction if the contract so reserves that right.

In a case before the

supreme court in 1872, the decision of the district court was reversed.
The district court had decided in favor of Wm. D. Colvin, a teacher,
who had sued School District No. 5 in the county of Wyandotte.
by Colvin on the following contract:
'It is hereby agreed by and between school-district No. 5, county of Wyandotte, state of Kansas ,
and William D. Colvin, a legally qualified teacher,
that said teacher .is to take, govern, and conduct
the public school of said district to the best of
his ability, keep a register of the daily attendance and studies of each pupi l belonging to the
school, and make other record s as the board may require, with the report required by law, and endeavor
to preserve in good condition and order the edifice,
grounds, furniture, apparatus, and such other district property as may come under his i nnnediate supervi sion as such teacher for a term of six months, commencing on the ninth day of September, 1870. And the
said school-district hereby agrees to keep the schoolhouse in good repair; to provide the necessary fuel
and school registers; and for the services of said
teacher, as aforesaid shown, well and truly performed, to pay said teacher the sum of three hundred and
sixty dollars on or before the expiration of said
school; the district board reserving the right to
discharge the teacher at any time he fails to give satisfaction to said board ••••••••• 1
The opinion of the court by Kingman,

1.
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c.

J.:

Action

..,..,

' The defendant in error engaged to teach a school
for the plaintiff in error for six months, under a
written contract whi ch contained this clause: ' The
district board reserving t he right to discharge the
teacher at any time he fails to give satisfaction to
said board.' Under this contract defendant in error
taught the school for three and a half months, and
was then discharged by the board. He was paid for
the fuml time he taught, and brought his action to
recover for the residue of the six months. It was
proven on the trial that he failed to give satisfaction to the board, and for that reason he was di scharged ••••••••••••••• It would be a public calamity
if a teacher employed for a year should prove negligent or immoral, and there was no way to rid the district of such a teacher. It was wise in such a case
to make provision by law for his discharge, and it
was thought wise to connect the county superintendent
with the board in any such action. If all the contracts were made as the one in this case is made,
there would be no necessity for such enactment. The
law was made for the benefit of the district . It
does not prevent the board from making any other contract with the teacher. In this case they have made
one which is not prohibited either by law or public
policy. No one doubts that a contract hiring a
teacher might be abrogated by mutual consent. So
they may stipulate in advance, as in this case, what
shall put an end to the contract. That contingency
arose, and the board, with the previous consent of
the teacher, put an end to the contract. There
seems to be no doubt but what that part of the contract was valid.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded
for further proceedings.
(All the justices concurring). 2
A school board may discharge a teacher without a formal trial,
for incompetency after giving notice , if it is so stipulated in the
contract.

).n

action was brought by A. Laura Armstrong against Union

School-District No . l, Dickinson e.nd Saline counties, for dam.ages alleged to. have been caused by the defendant I s illegal dismissal of the

2.
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plaintiff as a school-teacher of the said Union School-district.
opinion of the court in 1882 by Valentine, J.:
'It is admitted by counsel for both parties that
the only question involved in this case is whether
the plaintiff, A. Laura Armstrong, was legally dism.iseed as a school-teacher from the public school
held in Union school-district No. 1, Dickinson and
Saline counties, Kansas. She was employed as a
school-teacher by such school-district on September
6, 1881, and immediately entered upon the discharge
of her duties as such school-teacher. The contract
of employment was such as is generally used in the
employment of a teacher, except that it contained the
following proviso, to-wit: 'and provided, further
that if by the inability or neglect of the said .Armstrong the interests of the school shall suffer, the
district board shall have full power to annul this
contract, after one month's written notice.'
The plaintiff continued to teach in said school-district up to April 4, 1881, when the school board
finally dismissed and discharged her, on the ground
of inability and neglect . This was done in pursuance
of a written notice previously given to her and served upon her, March 5, 1881 •••••••••• She therefore
claims that the dismissal was illegal and void for
two reasons: First, because she did not have a formal trial; second, because the school-district board
in dismissing her did not act in conjunction with the
county superintendent •

.................................... ........... . ..

As to the mode of procedure by the school board
in coming to a determina.tion whether it would discharge the plaintiff or not, under the contract we
think it had an almost unlimited discretion. Neither
the contract nor the statute provides what the mode
of procedure should be in such cases ••••••••
This is substantially all there is in the case.
Counsel for plaintiff suggest some other ques_tions;
but having decided the main questions involved in
the case as we have, and under the circumstances of
the case, we do not think that it is necessary to
comment upon them. The judgment of the court below
will be affirmed.
Brewer , J.; concurring; Horton, c. J ., dissenting.' 3
3.
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The f ormality of a court is not required in the dismissal of a
teacher.

The directors of a school district may discharge a school

teacher for incompetency or neglect of duty; but afterward, if they are
sued by the teacher for the sum agreed to be paid him, it is then necessary for the directors to show that the teacher was dismissed for incompetency or negle ct of duty, and that in fact he was incompetent, or
that

he neglected his duty .

In a case before the court in 1883 , Joseph

McCoy had brought suit against School District No. 23, in Bourbon county,
to r e cover for wages claimed by him as a teacher in said district.

The

district court gave the plaintiff judgment against the defendant school
district .

The supreme court , however, reversed the decision of the dis -

trict court.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Valentine, J .:

'••••••••••••• It appears from the record, that on
September 11, 1880, the school district employed
McC oy t o teach a school r or eight months in that district, f or $40 per month. He taught the school from
September 13 , 1880, up to January 4, 1881, when he
was discharged by the district board, in conjunction
with the county superintendent of public instruction,
for incompetency . Previous to this discharge , the
district board requested the county superintendent
to act in conjunction with it in an investigation of
the charge of incompetency on the part of McCoy; and
McCoy was notified of such proposed investigation,
and at his request the investigation was adjourned a
few days , and set for January 4, 1881. On that day
the school-district board, in conjunction with the
county superintendent, met at the district school
house for the purpose of investigating the charge.
McCoy and his attorney appeared , as did also a large
proportion of the people of the district, including
the school children • .An investigation was had, but
not upon writ ten charges nor evidence under oath, but
upon oral testimony, not under oath . The district
board and county superintendent decided to discharge

GO

McCoy, and did discharge him; but no record of the
discharge nor of any of the proceedings was kept or
made. The board, however, at the time paid McCoy
in full for his services up to that time. and made
an entry of such payment on its records •••••••••• •
It seems to us that the district court committed
error. The whole of the statute with reference to
proceedings for the dismissal of school teachers is
as follows:
' The district boar d in each
district, •••• in conjunction with
the county superintendent , may
dismiss (a school teacher) for
incompetency, cruelty, negli gence ,
or immorality.'
There is no statute anyv,here to be found providing, either in terms or by implication, that the
school-district board and the county superintendent
when a cting together shall constitute a court . There
is no provision defining who shall be the presiding
officer in such cases, or whether there shall be any
presiding offi cer; no provision for a clerk, or sheriff, or marshall, or constable , or any other officer
except themselves . There is no provision for the
issuing or serving of writs or process ; no provision
for the filing of any pleadings ; no provisi on for administering oaths to witnesses , or even for hearing
the testimony of witnesses; no provision for reducing the proceedings to writing, or for preserving
any record of the same; no provision for keeping any
records; no provision for appeal or petition in error;
nothing, in fact, in all the statutes that even
squints toward the idea that the school-district board
acting in conjunction with the county superintendent,
in the dismissal of a school teacher, acts as a court
••••••••••••••••• it was held that the directors of a
school district may undoubtedly discharge a school
teacher for incompetency or neglect of duty; but that
afterward, if they are sued by the teacher for the sum
agreed to be paid him, it devolves upon the directors
to show that the teacher was dismissed for incompetency
or neglect of duty, and that in fact he was incompetent
or that he neglected his duty.
After a careful examination of this case, we are
satisfied that the district court erred, and that its

judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded for
a new trial.
All the Justices concurring. 14
A provision in a teacher's contract for discharge if not satisfactory to the school board is valid.

The case of L. C. Brovm v. School

District No. 41, Cowley County, Kansas, has been explained in Chapter II .
L.

c.

Brown had contracted to teach the school of District No. 41.

The

contract contained a clause that provided for the teacher's discharge if
he was not satisfactory to the school board.
before he started to teach the school.
decisi on of the district court , which
ant school district.

Mr . Brown was discharged

The supr eme court affi rmed the
ad decided in favor of the defend-

The opinion of the court delivered by Cole, J .:

The facts i n this case are that, before the time arrived for the plaintiff i n error to
enter upon his duties under the contract, a large
majority of the qualified electors of said district ,
at a school-district meet ing re gularly called and
held fo r the purpose of set t ling the que stion a s to
whether they would ret ain or dismiss plaintiff i n
error, expressed their dissatisfacti on , and voted
to dismiss him; and upon the authority of such vote ,
and after adopting a resolution of similar i mport
at a board meeting, the said board notified plaintiff in error in writing of the fact that the district did not desire his services; and when the
t i me arrived for school to commence he appeared
and demanded the ri ght to teach, and they refused
to permit him to do so. In instructing the jury
upon this clause in the contract, and under the
evidence aforesaid, the court said, i n substance,
that this clause did not give either board or the
district the right to dismiss the plaintiff in error
without any cause or excuse, but that its import was
that at any time the board or the majority of the
district had ~easonable ground f or dissatisfaction
1 ••••••••••
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they might dismiss the plaintiff in error and that
the question for the jury to settle upon this particular point was whether or not at the t:un.e when
the plai ntiff was dismissed either the board or a
majority of the district had reasonable grounds for
such dismissal . The court further instructed the
jury that it was not absolutely necessary, under the
contract, that the plaintiff should have had an opportunity to t ry his hand at teaching school before
such dismissal took place or the district or the
members of the board had reasonable ground t o believe that pl aintiff would not prove satisfactory ••••
The decision of the trial court is affirmed .
All the Judges concurring . 1 5
A teacher in a city of the second class cannot be removed before the end of the school term without cause .

In the case before the

court in 1896, The Board of Education of the Ci ty of Ottawa v. Jennie
Cook, the decis i on of the lower court in favor of Jennie Cook was affirmed.

The contract contained the follovring, 'unles s sooner removed

by vote of the board .'

It was dec ided that the clause did not specify

thecauses for which a teacher might be removed, nor can it be construed
to mean that the teacher may be removed without cause.

The opinion of

the court delivered by Dennison, J .:
'This action was brought in the district court
of Fr a.ri.klin county by Jennie Cook, as plaintiff,
against the Board of Education of the city of Ottawa, Kan., as defendant, to recover the runou_~t claimed to be due her as wages under a contract to teach
in the public schools of Ot tawa . The record dis closes the fact that she was elected by the board to
teach in the schools for the school year of 1890- '91
at $45 per month, and that she accepted the emplorment and entered upon her duties and taught for 62
months. The board paid her for six months' service
5.
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only •••••••••••••••
One of the rules and re gulat i ons of the board of
education for the year 1890-' 91 is the follovnng:
' SECTION 1. ( See section 204, Schools Laws of Kansas.) At the regular meeting in June, or as soon
thereafter as practicable, the board shall elect the
teachers of the publi c schools , to hold their positions for one year unle ss sooner removed by vote of
the board .'••••••••••••••
The board could not, therefore , le gally remove
Mi ss Cook by a vote except for a sufficient cause ,
and the question was properly submitted to the jury
as to whether there was sufficient cause for removal .
To decide otherwise , and t o hold t hat the words 'unless sooner removed by vote of the boa.rd ' must be
construed to mean that the board might remove without ca.use , or at its pleasure or caprice, would be
doing violence to all knovm definitions of words or
construction of sentences . The only rational interpretation of the whole contract, including the
rules of the board, is that all parties recognize
that there are causes for which a teacher may be removed, and the board employed Miss Cook to teach in
the city schools for the ensuing year, unless removed
by vote of the board for suffi cient cause. The case
was tried by both sides upon the theory that the
boar d must justify the r emoval of Miss Cook by her
actions, and the answer of the board to the petition
filed herein and all the evidences were directed toward showing that she continually violated the rules
of the board, and that she inflicted extremely cruel
punishment upon the pupils in her room . This question was properly submitted to the jury, and they
found in favor of Miss Cook ••••••••••••
The judgment of the district court is affirmed .
All the Judges concurring . 16

The act of a school-board, in c onjunction with the county superintendent, of dismissing a teacher is conclusive in t he absence of fraud,
corruption, or oppression.

In the case of School District No . 18, of

·Kearny County, Kansas, v . Levvis Davies , the supreme court reversed the

6.
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decision of the district court .

Mr . Davies .

The district court found in favor of

This case was before the court in 1904.

The opinion of the

court was de l ivered by Atkins on, J . :
' On August 10, 1901, school district No. 18 of
Kearny county, entered into a written contract with
Lewis Davies to teach school for a tenn of eight
months, to commence on September 30 following, at a.
salary of $40 per month, payable at the end of each
school month . Davies commenced work under this contract and continued t o teach, receiving payment
therefore, until January 31, 1902, when he was dismissed by the district board, acting in conjunction
with the county superintendent, on a charge of inoompe tency, cruelty, and negligence •
•• •• • ••• • • • • The record discloses that at a meeting
of the district board in conjunction with the county
superintendent , on January 31, 1902, plaintiff was
dismissed on the char ge of incompetency, cruelty alld
negligence . There was no claim of fraud, corruption
or oppression in the action of dismissal ••••• ••••••• •
It is manifest that the intention of the l egislature in enacting section 6184 was to provide a
speedy and inexpensive mode for the dismissal of
teachers from the distri ct schools . We believe that
the legislature established this tribunal, clothed
with the pov,er to dismiss , with the intention that
its acts should be final. The teacher takes his employment with the knowledge of this power and it
enters into his contract of hire, however made or
formulated. We can see no purpose or object of the
legislature in joining the county superintendent with
the district boa.rd and gi·v-ing the t ribunal thus created the power to dismiss teachers unless it was intended that, in the absence of fraud, corruption, or
oppression, its acts should be final and conclusive.
It would tend greatly to impair the government and
efficiency of the public schools if the honest judgment and discretion of this tribunal, so exercised,
were subject to review.
'!'he jud~ent of the district court is r eversed .
All the Justices concurring.
Maff6n, J., not sitting, having been of counsel .' 7
7.
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The unanimous decision of the county superintendent and two members
of a school board is sufficient for the dis.missal of a teacher.

The

school board and county superintendent constitute the proper tribunal to
determine a teacher's dismissal.

These were points brought out in the

case of Laura Duncan, Appellee, v. School District No. 8 of Reno County,
Appellant, by the court in 1910.

The decision of the district court of

Reno county was reversed by the supreme court.
given judgment to Laura Duncan, Appellee .

The district court had

The opinion of the court was

delivered by Smith, J.;
The contract in the usual form was signed
by two members of the board and the teacher.
The appellee entered upon her duties as such teacher and continued thereafter to teach until the 25th
day of November, 1907, when she was served with a notice , signed by all the members of the school board and
the county superintendent, to close the school, and
that she was dismissed on charges of incompetency and
negligence, and the schoolhouse was closed against her .
She was paid full wages, according to the terms of the
contract, for the time she taught the school. After
the expiration of the term for which she was employed
she brought this action to recover the amount of the
wages unpaid, at the rate prescribed in the contract .
A trial was had to the court and a jury, and a verdict
was returned in favor of the teacher for the full
amount claimed •••••••••••••••••
Testifying in regard to the meeting with the two
members of the board, the county superintendent said,
in substance, that they wanted her to quit and she
was unwilling to do so, end he told them they could
not dismiss her without his consent; they made complaint that she did not keep order, and that the children were not learning anything; that he told them he
was ready to pass his judgment, and there was only one
way to do it, and that by acting as they thought it
should be done; that they said she should quit; that
he and the two members of the board agreed in every
respect; •••••••••••••••
As before stated, there was no evidence contradict1 •••••••••
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ing these s~atements. rt is not contended but that
the evidence of the plaintiff was sufficient to justify the verdict and judgment, if she was not legally
dismissed. At the conclusion of the evidence the court
was requested in writing to instruct the jury to return a
verdict in favor of the defendant, and we see no reason
why this instruction should not have been given •••••••
The request for an instruction to return a verdict
for the defendant should have been allowed, and the
motion for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict
was not sustained by the evidence, should have been
sustained. The judgment is therefore reversed, and
the case is remanded with instructions to render judgment in favor of the defendant. 1 8
The conduct of a teacher in extending a vacation without consent
of the school board is a question of negligence.

The dismissal of a

teacher for negligence requires the concurrence of county superintendent.
The case of Mattie E. Parrick, Appellee, v. School District No. 1, in the
Counties of Riley end Geary, Appellant, has been explained in chapter II .
It was informally understood between the school board and the teacher ,
Mattie Parrick, that the vacation at Christmas time would be for a two
weeks period, due to bad roads and the shortage of coal .

The teacher

was married during the vacation and wrote to the clerk of the school
board that she would not be back until Jan. 10th, which date would extend the vacation another week.

This did not suit the school board.

When the teacher returned from her extended vacation she found another
teacher hired to teach the district school.
that she was dismissed because of negligence.

The school board maintained
The county superintendent

did not concur in the action with the school board.

8.
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The supreme court
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affirmed the decision of the lo,ve r court that Mattie Parrick could not
have been dismi ssed by the school board without the concurrence of the
county superintendent .

The opinion of the court was delivered by Dawson, J .:

'••••••••••••••.Ai'ter the term of school closed,
the plaintiff not having secured other professional
employment in the interim and there being no suggestion that with diligence she might have done so,
this action was begun, and judgment was rendered
against the school district for the teacher ' s wages
for four months, which was the remainder of the school
term according to her contract •••••••••••
Turning n ow to the ground of the teacher ' s dismissal for negligence: The statute provides that the
sanction of the county superintendent is necessary
to dismiss a teacher f or that delinquency. For
reasons which seemed sufficient to the county superintendent, she withheld her concurrence therein.
The county superintendent had a right to exercise
her dis cretion--her own judgment--with due consideration t o all the circumstances. With the exercise
of that discretion the court has no right to interfere . It is not enough that the court mi ght think
the circumstances sufficient to justify the dismissal of the teacher ••••• • • •••• , the authority for dismissing a teacher for negligence , etc., is not vested
in a mere majority of four persons , the three members
of the board and superintendent, but requires the independent as s ent of the superintendent in addition to
that of the board. Whi le the assent of a majority of
the school board, the independent concurrence of the
superintendent being withheld and denied, the pretended dismissal of the teacher was of no legal effect ••••
••••••••• In this way the legislature, in its wisdom,
has sought to safeguard district school teachers from
dismissal without sufficient cause or through arbitrary action, caprice or injustice on the part of the
school board ............
The judgment is affirmed .' 9
In the case of Nellie Brady Morris, Appellee, v . School District
No. 40 Joint in Lyon County, Appe llant, before the court in 1934, the

9.
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supreme court reve rsed the decision of the district court.

The district

had found in favor of the plaintiff, Nellie Brady Morris, suing for wages
due her , after what she termed an illegal dismissal .

The opinion of the

court was delivered by Burch, J.:
'The action was one by a school teacher, who was
dismissed before her term of employment expired, to
r ecover, from the school district which employed her ,
s alary for the portion of the term remaining after
dismissal . The verdict and judgment were for plaintiff, and the district appeals ••••••• • •••
Plaintiff alleged she was dismissed without just
cause or legal excuse., that she was qualified (not
incompetent) to teach, and had not been guilty of
cruelty, negligence , or immorality . There was no
allegation the boar d had not acted in conjunction
with the county superintendent., there was no alle gation of facts showing the board acted fraudulently.,
corruptly, or oppressively, and the petition did
not state a cause of action. It was for the board,
in con j unction with the county superintendent, to
determine whether there was just cause or excuse for
dismissal ••••••••••• • •
The board was required by statute to act in conjunction with the county superintendent, and did so .
The fact that the joint act of dismissal occurred
outside the territorial limit of the school district
did not detract from the validity of the dismissal • • • •
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and
the cause is remanded with direction to render judgment in favor of defendant . ,lO

10 . Kansas Reports , Vol mne 139, p . 268- 80 .

IV

TEACEER COMPENSATION
A teacher is entitled to receive reasonable value for services
if he is not working under a written contract.

In a case before t he

court in 1871, Larkin Jones v . School District No. 47, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court reversing the judgment of
the justice of peace .

'Jones brought suit before a justice of the

peace against School District No. 47 Neosho Co., to recover $150 a lleged
to be due him as assignee of

H.c.w.

H.c.w.

for three months' services of said

e.s a teacher of the district school under 'a certain contract'

made by and between the district board of said School District No. 47
and said H.C.W.

The defendant e.ppeared specially and moved to dismiss

the action, because, 1st, the justice had no jurisdiction, the amount
claimed being over one hundred dollars; 2d, the contract sued was not
in writing.

The justice overruled the motion, e.nd on final hearing

gave judgment for plaintiff for $150.

The defendant removed the cause

to the district court by petition in error, when said judgment, at t he
March tenn, 1871, was reversed.

Jones thereupon asked that the distri ct

court retain said action ' for trial and final judgment for costs given
against plaintiff . '

Jones now brings the case here on error.'

opin ion of the court was delivered by Brewer, J.:
1.
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The
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' ••••••• The bill of particular filed with the
justice alleged a teacher's contract with the district, but whether written or verbal was not disclosed. The testimony showed that it was verbal.
Section 5, p. 925, Gen. Stat ., requires teachers'
contracts to be in writing. It does not follow
from this that the district can have the benefit of
the teacher's services without compensating him
therefor. The teacher or his assignee can recover
of the district, not the stipulated price but the
reasonable value of the services actually performed. The law implies a contract from the doing and
accepting of work.
The judgment of the district court reversing the
judgment of the justice will be affirmed, and the
order of the court overruling the motion of the
plaintiff to have the cause retained for trial will
be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings, in accordance vrith this opinion. The costs
in this court vdll be charged against the defendant.
All the Justices concurring . 1 2
In en action by a teacher for salary, dismissal f'or incompetency
is held good defense.

In a case before the court in 1883 as explained

in Chapter III, (School District v. Mc Coy), McCoy brought suit against
School District No. 23, in Bourbon county, to recover for wages claimed
by him as a teacher in said district .

The opinion of the court was de-

livered by Valentine, J.:
'This was an action brought in the district court
of Bourbon county by Joseph McCoy against School
District No . 23 of that county, to recover for wages
claimed by him as a school teacher in such district
from January 4, 1881, up to the time of the commencement of this action, on March 25, 1881, at $40 per
month. The case was tried before the court and a
jury# and a verdict end judgment were rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for
$115 and costs. The defendant brings the case to this
court for review.
2.
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•••••••••• the directors of a school district may
undoubtedly discharge a school teacher for incompetency or neglect of duty; but afterward, if they are sued
by the teacher for the sum agreed to be paid him, it
devolves upon the directors to show that the teacher
was dismissed for incompetency or neglect of duty, and
that in fact he was incompetent, or that he neglected
his duty.
Af'ter a careful examination of this case, we are
satisfied that the district court erred, and that
its judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded
for a new trial.
All the Justices concurring. 13
A wrongfully discharged teacher may recover the balance due on a
contract.

This point was determined by the court in 1895.

The case

was 'The Board of Education of the City of Ottawa v . Jennie Cook.'

The

opinion of the court was delivered by Dennison, J .:
' Thi s action was brought in the district court of
Franklin county by Jennie Cook, as plaintiff, against
the Board of Education of the city of Ottawa, Kansas,
as defendant, to recover the amount claimed to be due
her as wages under a cont act to teach in the public
schools of Ottawa. The r e cord discloses the fact that
she was elected by the board to teach in the schools
for the school year of 1890- 1 91 at $45 per month, and
that she accepted the employment and entered upon her
duties and taught for 6½ months. The board paid her
for six months' service only.'
Miss Cook was dismissed at the end of the 6½ months period .
board did not pay her for the last two weeks she taught.
court found in favor of Miss Cook.
Kansas Courts of Appeals .

The district

This decision was affirmed by the

Continuing the opinion of the court:

' The amount of $22.50, and interest thereon, is
therefore due Miss Cook, even if the contention of

3.

The
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the couns el for the boar d t hat it had discretionary power to remove without cause be correct . There
was no er ror committed by the court in the instructions given.
The judgment of the di strict court is affirmed.
All t he Judges concurring. 1 4
A school board may pay teachers for time while school is dismissed
for a holiday.

In a case before the Kansas Courts of Appeals in 1898,

the decision of the district court was reversed, and this decision given.
The case was ' The Board of Education of the City of Emporia et al. v .
The State of Kansas, ex rel . , etc . '
The board of education, of the City of Emporia, pursuant to the
Thanksgiving proclamation of the president of the United States and of
the governor of the state of Kansas, determined to close the schools of
the city on Thanksgiving day, Thursday, November 29, 1894, to enable
the school childr en, with their parents, to observe the day in accordance with the general custom of the country .

The board deemed it ad-

visable to have the schools closed on the next day also, and so ordered.
The schools were accordingly closed on Thanksgiving day until the
following Monday.

The board intended to pay the teachers of the schools

the regular salary for the month of November without making any deduction on account of the two days during which the schools were to be
closed as aforesaid , and this action was brought on November 26 , 1894,
to prevent such payment .

The teachers did not request that the schools

be closed, nor did they consent thereto, but, on the contrary, they ob-

4.
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jected to suoh intermission if they would thereby lose their wages for
the time.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Milton, J.:
• • • • • • • • • • If the board acted within the limits
of its lawf'ul power and discretion in dismissing the
schools for the two days, its obligation to pay the
teachers is a necessary inference . The judgment of
the district court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in acoordanoe with the
views herein expressed.'
1

A director of a school board does not h~ve to sign a warrant when
there is a dispute as to the teacher's salary.

In the case before the

court in 1904, John W. Davis v. Nellie Jewett, the supreme court reversed the decision of the district court in favor of the plaintiff,
Nellie Jewett, a teacher .

The court decided a proceeding in mandamus

cannot be maintained against the director of a school district to compel him to sign a warrant drawn by the clerk on the treasurer for a
teacher's salary when there is a controversy over the right of the
teacher to compensation., and when the director has not been ordered by
a district meet ing or the district boa.rd to sign the warrant .
ion of the court was delivered by Smith, J .:
' Nellie Jewett, defendant in error, entered into
a written contract with school district No . 75, in
Johnson county, to teach for a term of seven months,
be ginning on September 16, 1901, at a monthly salary
of forty dollars. The contra.ct contained this proviso: 'In case said teacher fails to give satisfaction to a majority of board at end of any month,
shall be legally dismissed from school , t hen said
teacher shall not be entitled to compensation from
and after such dismissal .' John w. Davis , plaintiff
in error, was director of the school district, c. E.
5.
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The opin-

Jewett, clerk, and Mollie E. Watson, treasurer . On
Januar y 3 , 1902, a writ ten notice was served on Miss
Jewett , signed by the dire ctor and treasurer, informing her that she had failed to give satisfaction to
a ma jority of the board and notifying her to quit and
vacate the school on January 14, 1902, the end of the
school month . On the date last mentioned the schoolhous e was locked with a padlock, but the teacher gained
entrance to the building and continued to teach therein. The controversy was over the nonpayment of salary
for three months ' service, following the order of dismissal mentioned . Defendant in error was plaintiff
below, and brought this proceeding in mandamus to compel Davis , the director of the school district, to
sign two warre.nts, aggr egating ~~120, which had been
theretofore drawn on the treasurer by the clerk in
her favor , and signed by the latter . A preemptory
writ was awarded by the court below, the director,
Davis, has come here by proceedings in error •
• ••• • ••• • • It seems that the court below tried the
question of the liability of the school district tmder
the contract of employment. The plaintiff below had
no judgment against the district. Her right to recover was resisted because the board asserted the legal r ight to terminate the contract at the time it
did so by virtue of the conditions contained in it.
Plaintiff had a plain and adequate remedy at le:w by
action on the contract t o recover what · she claimed
was due •••••• • •••••• •
It is the duty of the director of a school district
to sign all orders drawn by the clerk on the treasurer
when they are ordered drawn by a district meeting or
t he di stri ct board . No such authority was shown to
have been given by the board to the director, Davis ,
to sign the school warrant s in favor of Miss Jewett,
and , in the absence of such authorization, it would
have been a clear violation of duty on his part to do
so • • • • •••••••••••
The judgment of the court below is reversed, with
directions to proceed further in accordance with this
opinion.
All the Justices concurring. 16
A teacher prevented from t eaching by a school board closing schools

6.
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during an epidemic can recover full salary .

A teacher is entitled to

salary for full term where board closes school a month early .

These

points were affirmed in the case before the court in 1913, S8Ill J . Smith,
Appellant, v . School District No . 64, Appellee .

The opinion of the

court was delivered by Porter, J.:
' The plaintiff, who is appellant, was employed
to teach school at a salary of $55 per month . The
action is to recover for two months ' s alary . A
copy of the written contract between the board and
the plaintiff was attached to the petition, and it
was alleged that plaintiff had been able, ready and
willing at all times to perform his part of the contract and had per formed the same ; and that the board
had failed to pay two months of the salary agreed
upon . The answer set up a general denial and a furthe r defense, admitting the execution of the writ'ten
contr act for a seven- months school, but alleging
that the plaintiff had failed to teach two months
of the term. On the trial, which was to the court,
it was shown by the plaintiff ' s testimony that the
school opened September 26 , 1910, and continued until February 9, when it was closed by order of the
board on account of siclmes s among the scholars. It
reopened March 14., and continued until April 11., at
which t ime., over appellant 's objections ., the board
ordered the term finally closed on the ground that
it was getting late and that a good many of the boys
were needed for farm work . It appeared that plaintiff was ready and willing to complete the full term
and had been paid for five months only. In his testimony he admitted., in substance, that the board was
willing to pay him for the sixth month, and the court
intimated an intention to hold that he was only entitled t o pay for one month ; and that as he had been
tendered an order for that month and refused to accept it the costs should be truced against him ••••••••
It must be obvious that the boar d could not avoid liabi lity for payment of the salary for the full term
by arbitrarily closing the school a month earlier
than the contract prov-ided ; and~ t hat since there was
no express stipulation f or a deduction from the compensation agreed upon by reason of the closing of the
school during the prevalence of a contagious disease

in the community, the plaintiff was entitled to his
salary for that month •• •••• • •••• •• • ••
The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to render judgment for the
plaintiff for the £Ull.ouht prayed for. 1 7
It is within power of a school district to tenninate a teacher's
contract because of insufficient :funds, where the teacher's contract
provided that it 'may be terminated by either party on tgi rty days'
notice when there exists some reasonable ground therei'or.'

The action

in terminating the contract must be in good faith., and timely notice
given of its termination.

These are points brought out by the court

in a case before it in 1924.

The case was:

Daisy Brown, Appellant., v.

The Board of Education of the City of Bonner Springs, Appellee.

Miss

Brown was informed by the superintendent of schools that her ser,rices
would not be needed because of insufficient funds after she had contracted to teach in the school t h

following year.

The opinion of the

court was delivered by Hopkins., J.:
1 The action was one to recover on a school
teacher's contract . The defendant prevailed and
plaintiff appeals .
The case was tried on an agreed statement of
facts ., which showed that on April 3, 1921., the
plaintiff and defendant entered into a writ;ten
con·t;ract whereby the plaintiff agreed to teach
music in the public schools of Bonner Springs for
the year beginning September 5., 1921., at a salary
of $135 per month . The contract contained this
provision : ' Fifth . That this contract may be
terminated by e i ther party on thirty days 1 notice
in writing t o be given by the party desiring such
termination, and only when there exists some reasonable ground therefor ., excepting that this contract

7.
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may be terminated at any time by mutual consent of the
parties thereto .'• • •••• • •• •••••• • • ••
The plaintiff contends that the contract was cancelled for the convenience and whim of the board of
education; that the notice given her in no way fell
within the provisions of the contract providing for
cancellation, and that there was no evidence of a
reasonable excuse for cancelling the contract •• ••• • • •
••• fair interpretation of the contract in controversy indicates that either party under the fifth
cl ause might cancel it, if acting in good faith and
for reasonable cause . There is no allegation or proof
indicating bad faith on the part of the defendant
board, and bad faith cannot be assumed.
The judgment is affirmed. 18

8.
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V

SUMMARY

CHAPTER II, TEACEER CONTRACTS .
A.

A contract with one member of a school district boa.rd is insufficient .

B.

A contract signed by tv,o members of a school district board
i n the absence of each other is not binding.

c.

It is sufficient that a contract be reduced to writing after
the board has adjourned if made in parol before .

D.

A contract between the teacher and the school board must be
in writing .

E.

A provision in a teacher's contract for discharge if not
satisfactory to the school board is valid.

F.

If all members of a school board agree to hire a certain
teacher, but one of the members is absent when contract is
made , the contract is nevertheless good .

G.

A teacher suing on a contract must prove the authority of the
officers signing _for the school district.

H.

An invalid contract will become binding on the board by rati-

fying it in accepting a teacher .
I.

Where a teacher is allowed t o teach, and paid, a school board
waives irregularities in employing her .
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J.

Misrepresentation of the teacher that she held a certificate
is equivalent to misrepresentation as to educational qualifications and contract is rendered unenforceable .

K.

A valid contract cannot be made prior to the annual April
meeting unless the school has ten or more teachers.

L.

Oral acceptance of a contract is insui'ficient.

The contract

must be written and signed by both parties.
M.

If the contract contains a provision that marriage during the
school term would terminate the contract; the fact that marriage
is performed before the term began is no excuse.

N.

A contract executed at a meeting of a board outside the territorial limits of the district is void.

o.

Consolidation of districts rendering teachers' services unnecessary does not relieve a district of its contractual liability.

CHAPTER III, TEACHER DISMISSAL AND ffi~OVAL .
A.

A contract may reserve the right to discharge the te~cher at
any time she fails to give satisfaction .

B.

By contract 6 a school board may discharge a teacher for incompetency after giving notice thereof .

c.

The formality of a court is not required in the procedure for
the dismissal of a teacher by a school board.

D.

If a teacher's contract provides for removal by the vote of

48

the board 1 the teacher is r emovable without cause .
E.

The act of a board in dismissing a teacher is conclusive in
the absence of fraud , corruption~ or oppression.

F.

The school board and the county superintendent constitute
proper tribunal to determine a teacher's dismissal .

G.

The unanimous decision of the county superintendent and two
members of a board is sufficient for the dismissal of a teacher .

H.

The conduct of a teacher in extending a vacation without consent of the board is a question of negligence .

CHAPTER TV 1 TEACHER COMPENSATION .
A.

A teacher is entitled to receive reasonable value for services
if not working under a WYitten contract .

B.

In an action by the teacher for salary~ dismissal by board
for incompetency is held good defense .

c.

A wrongfully discharged teacher may recover the balance due
on a c<bntract .

D.

A school board may pay teachers for the time while school is
dismissed for a holiday.

E.

A director does not have to sign a warrant for salary when
there is a dispute as to the teacher's salary unless given
authority by a district meeting or the school board.

F.

A teacher

prevented frrnn teaching by the board closing schools

during an epidemic can recover full salary.
G.

A teacher is entitled to salary for full term where a board
closes school month early.

H.

It is within the power of a school district to terminate a
teacher's contract because of insufficient funds, if the contract contains a provision to that effect.
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